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Abstract. Efficiency and security are the two main objectives of every
elliptic curve scalar multiplication implementations. Many schemes have
been proposed in order to speed up or secure its computation, usually
thanks to efficient scalar representation [30,10,24], faster point operation
formulae [8,25,13] or new curve shapes [2]. As an alternative to those
general methods, authors have suggested to use scalar belonging to some
subset with good computational properties [15,14,36,41,42], leading to
faster but usually cryptographically weaker systems. In this paper, we
use a similar approach. We propose to modify the key generation pro-
cess using a small Euclidean addition chain c instead of a scalar k. This
allows us to use a previous scheme, secure against side channel attacks,
but whose efficiency relies on the computation of small chains computing
the scalar. We propose two different ways to generate short Euclidean
addition chains and give a first theoretical analysis of the size and dis-
tribution of the obtained keys. We also propose a new scheme in the
context of fixed base point scalar multiplication.
Keywords: point multiplication, exponentiation, addition chain, SPA,
elliptic curves.
1 Introduction
After twenty five years of existence, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is now one
of the major public-key cryptographic primitives. Its main advantages, compared
to it main competitor RSA, are its shorter keys and the lack of fast theoretical
attacks. The recent factorization of an RSA modulus of 768 bits [17] is here
to highlight the significant role that ECC will play during the next decade. In
particular, it has been shown that ECC is suitable for cryptographic applications
on devices with small resources. However, if 160-bit ECC is believed to remain
secure, from a theoretical point of view, at least until 2020 [3], physical attacks
on cryptographic devices have proved to be an immediate threat [22]. Thus,
G. Gong and K.C. Gupta (Eds.): INDOCRYPT 2010, LNCS 6498, pp. 238–261, 2010.
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software or hardware ECC implementations have to deal with two apparently
opposite requirements: efficiency and security. Indeed, protecting a device from
physical attacks usually involves costly countermeasures.
In 2007,Me´loni proposed a secure algorithmbased onEuclidean addition chains
[27]. As they only involve additions, they are naturally resistant to SCA. However,
the efficiency of such a method relies on the existence of a small chain computing
the scalar. It has been pointed out that finding such a chain becomes more and
more difficult when the scalar grows in size. For cryptographic sizes, finding a good
chain is costlier than the scalarmultiplication itself. So, instead of proposing a new
scalar multiplication scheme,we propose to modify the key generation pro-
cess. More precisely, we show that it is possible to generate the key as a small
Euclidean addition chain, allowing us to use Me´loni’s fast and secure scheme.
From a general point of view, generating keys in a specific shape is not a
new idea. Various methods have been proposed through the years to generate
scalars belonging to some subset of the set of all possible keys, with good com-
putational properties [14,36,41,42]. However, this usually implies some serious
security issues [33,34,9,38]. Some methods remain cryptographically secure in
the context of a fixed base point but require large amount of stored data [4,15]
(Coron et al. [15] suggest to store from 50 to 100 points for the same security
level as that considered in the present work). Finally, some schemes use special
endomorphisms, such as the Frobenius map, on Koblitz curves [20].
From that perspective, our approach is quite different.Me´loni’s scheme only effi-
ciently applies on curve inWeierstrass form.Moreover, it is particularly suitable to
small devices with low computational resources because of its lowmemory require-
ment (at most two stored points) and resistance to side channel attacks. Yet, gen-
erating random Euclidean addition chains leads to several problems. First, what
is the size of the keys we can generate for a given chain length? In other words, is it
possible to achieve a certain level of security with relatively small chains? The sec-
ond problem is that of distribution. Indeed, many different chains of same length
can compute the same integer. It is then important to ensure that generating keys
this way does not weaken the discrete logarithm problem.
In this paper, we produce the first practical and theoretical results on random
Euclidean addition chain generation. We also show that it can lead to efficient
and SPA-secure scalar multiplication methods.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review Me´loni’s scheme.
In Section 3 we recall some background about Euclidean addition chains and
set notations. In Section 4 and 5, we describe two different families of Euclidean
addition chains and give some results on their distribution (notice that in Section
4 two variants are described). Finally, in Section 6 we propose some comparisons
with existing side-channel resistant scalar multiplication methods.
2 Scalar Multiplication Using Euclidean Addition Chains
For the sake of concision, we do not give details about scalar multiplication and
side channel attacks. We invite the reader to refer to [7,12] for detailed overview
of elliptic curve based cryptography.
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This section is dedicated to a specific scalar multiplication algorithm based
on Euclidean addition chains.
2.1 Euclidean Addition Chains
Definition 1. An Euclidean addition chain (EAC) of length s is a sequence
(ci)i=1...s with ci ∈ {0, 1}. The integer k computed from this sequence is obtained
from the sequence (vi, ui)i=0..s such that v0 = 1, u0 = 2 and ∀i ! 1, (vi, ui) =
(vi−1, vi−1+ui−1) if ci = 1 (small step), or (vi, ui) = (ui−1, vi−1+ui−1) if ci = 0
(big step). The integer k associated to the sequence (ci)i=1...s is vs + us, we will
denote it by χ(c).
Example : From the EAC (10110) one can compute the integer 23 as follows :
(1, 2)→ (1, 3)→ (3, 4)→ (3, 7)→ (3, 10)→ (10, 13)→ 23 = χ(10110).
2.2 Point Multiplication Using EAC
From any EAC c and any point P of an elliptic curve, it is shown in [27] that a
new point Q can be computed using the following algorithm :
Algorithm 1. EAC Point Mul(c:EAC,
P:point)
Require: P , [2]P
Ensure: Q = χ(c)P
1: (U1, U2)← (P, [2]P )
2: for i = 1 . . . length(c) do
3: if ci = 0 then
4: (U1, U2)← (U2, U1 + U2)
5: else
6: (U1, U2)← (U1, U1 + U2)
7: end if
8: end for
9: return Q = U1 + U2
Algorithm 2. Point multiplication
Require: P and an integer k
Ensure: Q = kP
1: c← Find EAC(k)
2: return Q = EAC Point Mul(c,P)
In [27], it is shown that any scalar multiplication can be performed using
the preceding algorithm. It is achieved by finding an Euclidean addition chain
computing the scalar. We will denote by Find_EAC , the algorithm which returns
an addition chain for an integer k.
It has been shown in [27] that the for loop of algorithm 1 can be efficiently
implemented on elliptic curves in Weierstrass form using Jacobian coordinates.
This leads to a fast point multiplication method resistant to side channel attacks
since at each step of the for loop, the same operation is used .
The efficiency of algorithm 2 directly depends on the length of the chains
and the complexity of the algorithm Find_EAC. Although finding an Euclidean
addition chain computing a given integer k is quite simple (it suffices to choose an
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integer g co-prime with k and apply the subtractive form of Euclid’s algorithm)
finding a short chain remains a hard problem. As an example, the average length
of the computed chain for k with g uniformly distributed in the range [1, k] is
O(ln2 k) [18]. For 160-bit scalars, experiments have shown that, on average, it is
required to try more that 45,000 different g to find a relatively small chain using
the Montgomery heuristic [32].
2.3 Our Approach
We propose in this paper to proceed differently. Instead of randomly choosing an
integer k and then trying to find a suitable EAC c to finally compute the point
kP , we propose to randomly generate a small length EAC c and then compute
the associated point on the curve. More precisely, we will see in the next sections
that the chains will be chosen in a subset of short chains for key distribution
matters.
From definition 2.1, notice the random generation of a s-length EAC boils
down to the random generation of a s-bit integer. As an example, algorithm 3
shows how to process Diffie-Helmann key exchange protocol with EAC.
Algorithm 3. Diffie-Helmann using EAC
Require: a point P
Ensure: Output a common key K
1: A randomly generates a short EAC c1
2: B randomly generates a short EAC c2
3: A computes Q1 =EAC Point Mul(c1, P ) and send it to B
4: B computes Q2 =EAC Point Mul(c2, P ) and send it to A
5: A computes K =EAC Point Mul(c1, Q2)
6: B computes K =EAC Point Mul(c2, Q1)
Using this approach we compute points kP for a subset S of all possible values
for the integers k. Hence we do not deal any more with the classical Discrete
Logarithm Problem but with the Constrained Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Name : CDLP
Input : p a prime number, g a generator of a group G, S ⊂ Zp, and gx for x ∈ S.
Problem : Compute x.
The complexity of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) over a generic group
directly depends on the size of this group. It has been shown that the constrained
version of this problem (CDLP), where only a subset S of the group is considered,
has a similar complexity. Indeed, for a random set S, Ω(
√|S|) group operations
[28] are required to solve the CDLP. As an example, if one naively chooses to
generate random Euclidean chain of length 160 (which means there are 2160 of
them), we will see, in section 3, that the biggest integer that can be generated
is F164 $ 2112.7. This means that the number of elements of the set S is at most
2113, leading to a security of at most 66.5 bits.
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In this paper, we propose to study two families of EAC providing good balance
between security and efficiency. In practice, it implies that the chains are long
enough so that the corresponding set S of generated keys is sufficiently large,
but short enough so that the scalar multiplication remains fast.
3 Notations and Properties
We give in this section some notations and important results for the sequel of
this paper.
Definition 2. Let n and p be two integers, we define :
. M as the set of EAC and Mn as the set of EAC of length n > 0,
. Mn,p as the set of EAC of length n > 0 and Hamming weight p > 0.
. χ the map from M to N, such that for m ∈M, χ(m) be the integer computed
from the EAC m,
. ψ the map from M to N × N, such that for m ∈ M, ψ(m) = (vs, us) if
m ∈Ms,
. S0 the matrix
(
0 1
1 1
)
corresponding to a big step iteration,
. S1 the matrix
(
1 1
0 1
)
corresponding to a small step iteration.
With these notations, for m = (m1, . . . ,ms) ∈Ms, we have :
ψ(m) = (1, 2)
s∏
i=1
Smi and χ(m) = 〈(1, 2)
s∏
i=1
Smi ,(1, 1)〉.
Let r and s be two integers, we will denote bymm′ the element ofMr+s obtained
from the concatenation of m ∈Mr and m′ ∈Ms. This way, for n > 0, mn is a
word of Mnr if m ∈Mr.
For convenience, M0 will correspond to the set with one element e which is
the identity element for the concatenation.
For m and m′ two elements of Mr such that ψ(m) = (v, u) and ψ(m′) =
(v′, u′) we will say that ψ(m) " ψ(m′) if v " v′ and u " u′.
Proposition 1. Let n > 0, Fi be the ith Fibonacci number, αn =
(1+
√
2)n+(1−√2)n
2 and βn =
(1+
√
2)n−(1−√2)n
2
√
2
:
. ψ(0n) = (Fn+2, Fn+3), ψ(1n) = (1, n+ 2), χ(0n) = Fn+4, χ(1n) = n+ 3,
. ∀m ∈Mn, χ(1n) " χ(m) " χ(0n), and ψ(1n) " ψ(m) " ψ(0n),
. Sn0 =
(
Fn−1 Fn
Fn Fn+1
)
, Sn1 =
(
1 n
0 1
)
,
. (S0S1)
n =
(
αn − βn βn
βn αn + βn
)
, (S1S0)
n =
(
αn 2βn
βn αn
)
.
Proof. The first property is straightforward. The other ones can be proved by
induction.
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Notice that from Sm+n0 = Sm0 Sn0 , we can recover a well known identity on
Fibonacci sequence, namely :
Fm+n = Fm−1Fn + FmFn+1. (1)
Proposition 2. Let n > 0 and m = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Mn, then the map ψ is
injective and χ(m1, . . . ,mn) = χ(mn, . . . ,m1).
Proof. We refer to [19] for standard link between EAC, Euclidean algorithm and
continued fractions, which explains the second point. It is also explained that if
ψ(m) = (v, u) then (u, v) = 1 and the only chain which leads to (v, u) is obtained
using the additive version of Euclidean algorithm.
4 A First Family of EAC
We will consider in this section M0n the subset ofM2n whose elements are EAC
beginning with n zeros.
4.1 Some Properties ofM0n
From proposition 2 the restriction of χ to Mn is not injective because of the
mirror symmetry property.
Proposition 3. The restriction of χ to M0n is injective.
Proof. Let x and y be two words of M0n such that χ(x) = χ(y), and m0n,
m′0n, be the words obtained when reading x and y from right to left. Using
the symmetry property, we have χ(m0n) = χ(m′0n). Let (v, u) = ψ(m) and
(v′, u′) = ψ(m′), then
χ(m0n) = χ(m′0n)
⇔ Fnu+ Fn−1v + Fn+1u+ Fnv = Fnu′ + Fn−1v′ + Fn+1u′ + Fnv′
⇔ Fn+2(u − u′) = Fn+1(v′ − v)
Since (Fn+1, Fn+2) = 1, then Fn+2 divides v′ − v. Now from proposition 1,
since v and v′ are less or equal than Fn+2 and nonzero, then |v′ − v| < Fn+2
which implies that v = v′ and so u = u′. Hence ψ(m) = ψ(m′), so m = m′.
Proposition 4. χ(M0n) ⊂ [(n + 1)Fn+2 + Fn+3, F2n+4], the lower (resp. the
upper) bound being reached by 0n1n (resp. 02n). The mean value is (32 )
n
Fn+4.
Proof. Let 0nx1y and 0nx0y be two elements of M0n where x and y are chains
of size a and n − 1 − a with a ∈ [0, n − 1]. From the definition of χ it follows
that χ(0nx1y) < χ(0nx0y). Hence the smallest integer is computed from the
word 0n1n and the greatest from 0n0n. Now χ(0n1n) = 〈(1, 2)Sn0 Sn1 ,(1, 1)〉 and
χ(02n) = 〈(1, 2)S2n0 ,(1, 1)〉. From proposition 1, we deduce that χ(0n1n) = (n+
1)Fn+2 + Fn+3 and χ(02n) = F2n+4.
244 F. Herbaut et al.
To compute the mean value, let us consider n independent Bernoulli random
variables C1, . . . , Cn such that ∀i ∈ [1, n], Pr(Ci = 0) = Pr(C1 = 1) = 1/2. The
mean value is E(X) where X = χ(0nC1 . . . Cn). Now
X = 〈(1, 2)Sn0
n∏
i=1
(
Ci 1
1−Ci 1
)
,(1, 1)〉.
Notice that X is a polynomial of Z[C1, . . . , Cn]/(C21 −C1, . . . , C2n −Cn). As the
Ci are independent then ∀J ⊂ [1, n], E(∏j∈J Cj) =∏j∈J E(Cj), hence
E(X) = 〈(1, 2)Sn0
∏n
i=1
( E(Ci) 1
1−E(Ci) 1
)
,(1, 1)〉 = 〈(1, 2)Sn0
∏n
i=1
( 1
2 1
1
2 1
)
,(1, 1)〉.
The final result comes from proposition 1 and the equality :
∀n ∈ N∗,
(
1
2 1
1
2 1
)n
= (3/2)n−1
(
1
2 1
1
2 1
)
.
4.2 Application to Existing Standards
Using the set χ(M0n), we can generate (with algorithm 1) 2n distinct points
χ(c)P for a point P whose order is greater than F2n+4. Of course, when the
order d of the point P is known, we have to choose the largest integer n such
that F2n+4 < d.
Because of the results on the difficulty to solve the CDLP problem, we have
to consider the set M0n only for n ! 160. For n = 160, we have χ(M0160) ⊂
[161F162 + F163, F324], that is to say
χ(M0160) ⊂ [2118.6, 2223.6].
Such data fit well with the secp224k1 and secp224r1 parameters where the
order of the point P is about 2223.99 [6]. Those parameters are consistent with
ANSI X.962, IEEE P1363 and IPSec standards and are recommended for ANSI
X9.63 and NIST standards.
4.3 A Variant for the secp160k1 and secp160r1 Recommended
Parameters
In the secp160k1 and secp160r1 recommended parameters, the order d of the
point P is around 2160. Using the set M0n, this leads us to choose n = 114
which only gives rise to 2114 distinct points. Hence the complexity of an attack
is Ω(257) which may expose this method to some attacks.
Notice that if we use an element c of M0160 with the point P of order d then
the algorithm 1 computes (χ(c) mod d)P . If the values of {χ(c) mod d, c ∈
M0160} are well distributed among Z/dZ, then we can use the above mentioned
method, provided that computing χ(c)P with algorithm 1 be more efficient than
computing kP with k ∈ Z/dZ, with a classical SPA-resistant method. This last
point will be discussed in section 6, we will focus now on the problem of the
distribution. To this end, we will adapt results on Stern sequences from [35].
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Table 1. Distribution of χ(M0n) modulo d
!!n
t
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
#χ(Mn0 )
d
10 294 312 214 70 12 4 1 0.66
15 10814 12044 6216 2026 436 76 15 0.66
20 266749 327372 194442 74219 20589 4344 789 100 18 1 0.7
25 6493638 8894037 5979946 2627531 850691 216285 44567 7832 1233 162 15 1 1 0.74
29 74024780 115132679 88980442 45585634 17436296 5315191 1347286 294399 56344 9674 1459 193 18 4 0.79
Theorem 1. Let d be a prime number, m ∈ M! such that ψ(m) = (v, u). If
d+ |u, and d+ | v then there exist constants cd ∈ R+ and τd ∈ [0, 1[ so that for all
α ∈ (Z/dZ)∗, r ∈ N∣∣∣∣#{x ∈Mr | χd(mx) = α}2r − dd2 − 1
∣∣∣∣ < cdτrd , and∣∣∣∣#{x ∈Mr | χd(mx) = 0}2r − 1d+ 1
∣∣∣∣ < cdτrd .
Proof. See annex for the proof and the link with Stern sequences.
Taking m as the all zeros 160 bits vector, this asymptotic result let us think that
the values χ(c) for c ∈ M0160 are well distributed modulo d since (F162, d) =
(F163, d) = 1. In order to illustrate this theoretical result, we made several nu-
merical tests by generating all EAC ofM0n (from n = 10 to n = 29) and reducing
the corresponding integer modulo a n-bits prime number (recall that for a prac-
tical use, we consider elements of M0160 and a point P of order d about 2160).
Table 1 seems to show that even for chains whose length is much smaller than d,
the distribution is not so bad. For each value of n, a random n-bits prime dn has
been generated. We have then computed for each α ∈ Z/dnZ, the cardinality
δα of χ−1(α) in M0n. Let T = {δα | α ∈ Z/dnZ}, for each t in T we have then
computed how many integers in [0, d − 1] are exactly computed t times. As an
example, for t = 0 we know how many integers are never reached when reducing
modulo d the value χ(c) for c ∈M0n.
5 A Second Family of EAC and an Open Problem
In order to generate a 160 bits integer, the author of [26] gives numerical results
which show that the search for a chain whose length be less than 260 needs
about 223 tests using a heuristic from Montgomery [32]. With such chains, Al-
gorithm 1 needs less multiplications than the classical SPA-resistant algorithms.
We investigated the problem of choosing shorter chains in order to speed up the
performances of algorithm 1. Once the length ( is fixed we have to deal with two
constraints :
– the number p of 1’s in the chain must be chosen so that the greatest integer
generated is as near as d ($ 2160) as possible,
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– because of the non-injectivity of χ ,
(
!
p
)
must be greater than 2160 in order
to hope that the integers generated reach most of the elements of [1, 2160].
These two constraints lead us to study the sets M!,p where p < (/2.
Theorem 2. Let (p, () ∈ N2 such that 0 < 2p < (. Let Fi be the ith Fibonacci,
αp = (1+
√
2)p+(1−√2)p
2 , βp =
(1+
√
2)p−(1−√2)p
2
√
2
, then
i) For all m ∈M!,p we have, F!−p+4+pF!−p+2 " χ(m) " F!−2p+4(αp+βp)+
βpF!−2p+2.
ii) The lower bound is reached if and only if m = 1p0!−p or m = 0!−p1p.
iii) The upper bound is reached if and only ifm = (01)p0!−2p or m = 0!−2p(10)p.
Proof. See annex.
To improve the performances of Algorithm 1, we choose to use chains whose
length is 240. In this case p = 80 seems to be the best choice with respect to our
two constraints. With such parameters, we can randomly generate about 2216
chains computing integers in the interval [2117.7, 2158.9]. Unfortunately, it seems
to be a hard problem to compute the number of distinct integers generated in
this way.
This naturally leads us to consider the set M3p,p. Numerical experiments for
some values of p let us think that the cardinality of χ(M3p,p) is near from 22p.
Notice that from the preceding theorem, it can be proved that the upper bound
for ( = 3p is equivalent to γ
( (1+√2)(1+√5)
2
)p where γ = (1+√5)4
32
√
5
+ (1+
√
5)4
32
√
10
+
(1+
√
5)2
8
√
10
which is close to γ21.96p. We end this section with an open problem :
What is the cardinality of χ(M3p,p) ? The good performances of this method
(see next section) make this problem of interest. Notice that a straightforward
argument gives that the number of distinct integers generated (for the proposed
parameters) is greater than 2106. Indeed, it follows from proposition 3 that the
chains 0120c, where c ∈M120,80 give rise to distinct integers.
6 Comparisons
In this paper we have proposed three different ways to compute a point on the
curve from an Euclidean addition chain :
Method 1: use a chain from M0160 for curves of order about 2224.
Method 2: use a chain from M0160 for curves of order about 2160 even if χ(c)
can be greater than the order, using the results on Stern sequences.
Method 3: use a chain from M240,80 for curves of order about 2160.
The interest of Method 1 is that it is the only method for which we have
a proved security. The main drawback is that it forces us to work on curves
defined over larger fields ($ 2224 elements instead of 2160). However, we will see,
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in Section 6.2, that it might not be such a problem in practical implementations.
Moreover, this method shows to be particularly relevant in the context of fixed
base point scalar multiplication.
Method 2 allows us to reduce the size of the underlying fields by using Stern’s
results. Numerical samples tend to show that the generated keys are well dis-
tributed but we still lack a complete security proof.
Finally, in Method 3, we try to reduce both the size of the fields and the
length of the chains. In that case, it becomes very complicated to analyze the
distribution of the generated keys. In particular, the system becomes highly
redundant, which might lead to a bias in the set of possible chains. Typically,
this would make this method irrelevant for signature and key-exchange schemes.
We propose to compare our work to other side-channel resistant methods with
a similar security level. We do not take into account special key generation meth-
ods as they usually provide lower security level [33,34]. One could try to increase
the size of the underlying field (as we do with Method 1) to solve this issue,
however this would make those approaches slower than general algorithms. In
the fixed point scenario, special key generation methods usually provide enough
security but require in the same time a large amount of stored data: from 50
to 1000 precomputed points [15,4] when we only require a table of two stored
points.
In Table 2, we summarize the cost, in terms of field multiplications, of various
SPA-resistant scalar multiplication schemes providing a security of 80 bits. In
order to ease comparisons, we make the traditional assumption that the cost of
a field squaring (S) is 80 percent of that of a field multiplication (M).
Random Base Point. In that scenario, a new base point P is computed for
each new session. This implies that it is not possible to precompute oﬄine mul-
tiples of P to speed up the process.
We consider the following SPA resistant methods:
– Dummy operations consist of adding a dummy point addition during the
double-and-add algorithm, when the current bit is a 0.
– The Montgomery ladder is a SPA resistant algorithm from Peter Mont-
gomery [31], performing one doubling and one addition for each bit of the
scalar. It is only efficient on Montgomery curves.
– Unified formulae allow to perform doubling and addition with the same
formulae on specific curve shapes. They can be then combined with the NAF
representation for scalar multiplication. The cost of the unified operation is
11M, 12M and 14M on Edwards [2], Hessian [16] and Jacobi curves [23]
respectively. We do not compare to Brier and Joye general unified formulae
due to their quite high cost (18M) [5].
– Mo¨ller proposed a modified version of Brauer (2w-ary) algorithm [29]. Using
precomputations, its pattern is independent from the scalar itself. In that
case, we used the latest and fastest point addition and point doubling formu-
lae in Jacobian coordinates (see [1] for complete overview). One can also refer
to the Left-to-Right recodings methods proposed in [39] whose performances
are similar.
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Fixed Base Point. In the context of a fixed base point we propose a new scalar
multiplication scheme based on our chains generation method. Notice that in
Methods 1 and 2, the 160 first steps of Algorithm 1 are fixed, independently of
the scalar, and correspond to big steps. Hence we can precompute and store the
points F162P and F163P and then generate random chains of length 160. We
compared these methods to the classical Comb method.
Table 2. Cost of various SPA resistant scalar multiplication methods providing 80 bits
of security
Point gen. Method curve field size (bits) # precomp. points #Field Mult.
random
Dummy operations general 160 1 3530
Montgomery ladder Montgomery 160 1 1463
Unified formulae Edwards 160 1 2335
Unified formulae Hessian 160 1 2548
Unified formulae Jacobi 160 1 2973
Unified formulae Edwards 160 7 2130
Unified formulae Hessian 160 7 2324
Unified formulae Jacobi 160 7 2711
Mo¨ller’s recoding general 160 16 1843
fixed
Comb Method general 160 2 1754
Comb Method general 160 4 1177
Comb Method general 160 8 866
Comb Method general 160 16 688
random
Method 1 general 224 1 2104
Method 1 (x only) general 224 1 1790
fixed
Method 1 general 224 2 1048
Method 1 (x only) general 224 2 888
random
Method 2 general 160 1 2104
Method 2 (x only) general 160 1 1790
Method 3 general 160 1 1576
Method 3 (x only) general 160 1 1336
fixed
Method 2 general 160 2 1048
Method 2 (x only) general 160 2 888
To be completely fair, we evaluate in the next section the additional cost of
working on larger fields with Method 1.
As for Method 2 and 3, Table 2 shows our different methods provide very
good results. In the random point scenario, Methods 2 and 3 perform generally
better that their counterparts. Only Montgomery’s algorithm can be claim to
be faster, but its use is restricted to Montgomery’s curves. Besides, computing
the x coordinate only with Method 3 leads to a faster scheme. In the fixed based
point scenario, the Comb method requires at least 4 times more stored points
to perform faster than our methods.
Random Euclidean Addition Chain Generation and Its Application 249
6.1 Comparison of Method 1 with Algorithms Working on 160-Bit
Integers
Recall that Method 1 requires to work on fields of larger size (2224 elements).
Hence to be fair in our comparisons, we need to evaluate the additional cost of
performing multiplications in larger fields. To this end, we are going to consider
three contexts for modular multiplication. For each of them, we will identify
scenarios for which it is worth using our method.
a) The CIOS method [21]: the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning
method is an efficient implementation of Montgomery’s modular multiplication
for a large class of processor. From [21] a modular multiplication between two in-
tegers stored as s words of w bits needs 2s2+s w-bits multiplications, 4s2+4s+2
w-bits additions, 6s2 + 7s+ 2 w-bits read instructions and 2s2 + 5s + 1 w-bits
write instructions. Using these results, we can estimate the cost in terms of w-
bits operations of the methods listed in Table 2.This leads us to the following
remarks.
On a 32 bits processor, for a random point P , Method 1 with x-only is the
most performant SPA resistant method which can be used on any curve and
which only stores the point P . For a fixed point P , if only two points can be
stored, this latter is better than Comb method. On a 64 bits processor, the
preceding remarks remain true. Moreover, the fixed point method (without
the x coordinate trick) is competitive with the Comb method when only two
points are stored. On a 128 bits processor, since two words are needed to store
160 bits integer or 224 bits integer, we only have to compare the number of
field multiplications in Table 2. This shows that our method in the fixed point
context is better than the Comb method when storing 2 or 4 points. For random
point context, if one needs an SPA resistant algorithm which works on any
curve and stores no more than one point, then our method gives the best result.
b) The GNU multiprecision library: we provide benchmarks for fair
comparisons between modular multiplications in the case of practical use with
the library GMP. We compute several times 228 modular multiplications (using
Table 3. Performances of Method 1 using CIOS method on 32 bits processor
s # Field mult. 32 bits × 32 bits + 32 bits Read 32 bits Write
Method 1, x-only 7 1790 187950 404540 617550 239860
Dummy 5 3530 194150 430660 660110 268280
Method 1, fixed point, x-only 7 888 93240 200688 306360 118992
Comb method, 2 stored points 5 1754 96470 213988 327998 133304
Table 4. Performances of Method 1 using CIOS method on 64 bits processor
s # Field mult. 64 bits × 64 bits + 64 bits Read 64 bits Write
Method 1, fixed point 4 1048 37728 85936 132048 55544
Comb method, 2 stored points 3 1754 36834 87700 135058 59636
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Table 5. Time to compute 228 modular multiplications with GnuMP
p 32 bits Intel T2500 2.0Ghz 64 bits AMD Opteron 8382 2.6Ghz
Tmin 135.96s Tmin 28.12s
160bits 2160 − 231 − 1 Tmax 140.49s Tmax 32.49s
Taverage 137.88s Taverage 30.42s
Tmin 198.22s Tmin 32.24s
224bits 2224 − 296 + 1 Tmax 201.86s Tmax 33.93s
Taverage 200.51s Taverage 32.67s
Taverage 224/Taverage 160 1.45 1.07
Tmax 224/Tmin 160 1.48 1.17
Table 6. Performances of Method 1 with GnuMP
Point gen. Method curve storage Mult. (32 bits proc.) Mult. (64 bits proc.)
random
Method 1 general 1 3114 2462
Method 1 (x only) general 1 2650 2095
fixed
Method 1 general 2 1552 1227
Method 1 (x only) general 2 1315 1039
mpz mul and mpz mod) on 32 and 64 bits processors. We consider reduction
modulo a prime number p conformant to the ANSI X9.63 standard [6] (resp.
FIPS186-3 standard [40]) for the 160 bits (resp. 224 bits) case. From these
benchmarks, we deduce an average time to compute a modular multiplication
as detailed in table 5. Let us now consider the ratio in the most pessimistic
case : the cost of a 224 bits modular multiplication is 1.17 times (resp. 1.48
times) the cost of a 160 bits multiplication for 64 bits (resp. 32 bits) processor.
Taking into account these results, we can give an estimate in terms of 160 bits
multiplications of Method 1. This shows the interest of Method 1, specially
in the fixed point context (see table 2).
c) Hardware context: we considered in this section two kinds of com-
ponents from the STMicroelectronics portfolio. The first embeds the Public
Key 64 bits crypto processor from AST working at 200Mhz (CORE65LPHVT
technology) and the second the 128 bits hardware smartcard cryptographic
coprocessor Nescrypt working at 110Mhz. The AST crypto processor can
compute about 2040816 160-bits modular multiplications and 1449275 224-bits
modular multiplications per second. Taking into account these results, table 7
gives the time needed by the modular multiplications when computing a point
multiplication. Once again, in the random point context, Method 1 obtains best
performances if one needs an SPA resistant algorithm working on a general
curve and storing only one point. In the fixed point context, Method 1 is faster
than the Comb method with two points. Notice that we only consider the
multiplications done by the cryptoprocessor for the times given in table 7. We
do not take into account the overhead involved by the communications between
the processor and the crypto processor.
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Table 7. Time comparison for scalar multiplication methods in milliseconds
Point gen. Method curve # precomp. points msecs
random (160 bits)
Dummy operations general 1 1.73
Montgomery ladder Montgomery 1 0.717
Unified formulae Edwards 1 1.144
Unified formulae Hessian 1 1.249
Unified formulae Jacobi 1 1.457
Unified formulae Edwards 7 1.044
Unified formulae Hessian 7 1.139
Unified formulae Jacobi 7 1.328
Mo¨ller’s recoding general 16 0.903
fixed (160 bits)
Comb Method general 2 0.859
Comb Method general 4 0.577
Comb Method general 8 0.424
Comb Method general 16 0.337
random (224 bits)
Method 1 general 1 1.452
Method 1 (x only) general 1 1.235
fixed (224 bits)
Method 1 general 2 0.723
Method 1 (x only) general 2 0.613
Nescrypt 128 bits crypto processor can compute about 339506 modular mul-
tiplications per second both for 160 bits and 224 bits integers. Indeed in both
cases, only two 128 bits blocks are used to manipulate these integers. Hence we
can do the same remarks as in the section about the CIOS method.
7 Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to describe subsets of integers k for which the compu-
tation of kP is faster, when dealing with the problem of SPA-secure exponenti-
ation over an elliptic curve. We studied three such subsets and produced the first
practical and theoretical results on random Euclidean addition chain generation.
Table 2 shows that our methods provide good results in various situations when
compared with the best SPA-secure methods.
We proved that the Method 1 we considered is secure and fast. In particular, in
the context of a fixed base point, it is competitive with actual methods and faster
when using similar amount of storage. We detailed several practical scenarios for
which the method is relevant and improves efficiency : in CIOS context, in the
context of GNU multiprecision library, and on some cryptoprocessors.
At last, we began the theoretical study of the other proposed methods. We
made links between Method 2 and Stern sequences which enabled to obtain
optimistic but asymptotic results. We managed to begin the study of the dis-
tribution of integers generated by Method 3. Both methods would improve the
performances once again. For example Method 3 would be faster than Mont-
gomery ladder, thus it would be worth studying it further. We have proved some
results that may be useful for any further investigation.
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Annex
Proof of Theorem 1
Definition 3. Let (a, b) ∈ N2, the generalized Stern sequence
(sa,b(r, n))r∈N,n∈[0,2r] is defined by sa,b(0, 0) = a, sa,b(0, 1) = b, and for r ! 1,
sa,b(r, 2n) = sa,b(r − 1, n), sa,b(r, 2n+ 1) = sa,b(r − 1, n) + sa,b(r − 1, n+ 1).
In his original paper, Stern gave a practical description of his sequence using the
following diatomic array [37] :
(r = 0) a b
(r = 1) a a+ b b
(r = 2) a 2a+ b a+ b a+ 2b b
(r = 3) a 3a+ b 2a+ b 3a+ 2b a+ b 2a+ 3b a+ 2b a+ 3b b
...
where each line r is exactly the sequence sa,b(r, n) for n ∈ [0, 2r]. Notice that
to compute the row r, you just have to rewrite row r − 1 and insert their sum
between two elements. In the case (a, b) = (1, 1), the sequence is called the Stern
sequence and has been well studied. For example, see the introduction of [35] or
[11] for the link with the Stern Brocot array.
Now we will point deep connections between Stern sequences and the ψ and
χ maps. These connections should not surprise us, because both are linked with
continued fractions. As an example, if (a, b) = (1, 1), an easy induction enables
us to prove that when n ∈ [0, 2r[, the sequence (s1,1(r+1, 2n), s1,1(r+1, 2n+1))
describes the set ψ(Mr).
(r = 0) 1 1
(r = 1) 1 2 1
(r = 2) 1 3 2 3 1 (M2 = { 00, 01, 10, 11})
(r = 3) 1 4 3 5 2 5 3 4 1 (ψ(M2) = { (3, 5), (2, 5), (3, 4), (1, 4)})
...
Let us note ∆ : N2 → N2 such that ∆(x, y) = (y, x). Another induction enables
to prove that when n ∈ [0, 2r+1 − 1], (s1,1(r + 1, n), s1,1(r + 1, n+ 1)) describes
ψ(Mr) ∪ ∆(ψ(Mr)). For ( ∈ N∗ and m ∈ M!, let Ar(m) = {ψ(mx) | x ∈
Mr} ∪ {∆(ψ(mx)) | x ∈Mr}.
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From now on, in order to simplify the notations, we will denote by s(r, n)
the value sa,b(r, n). Let us define the sequences
(
S(r, n)
)
r∈N,n∈[0,2r−1] by
S(r, n) = (s(r, n), s(r, n + 1)) and
(
Sd(r, n)
)
r∈N,n∈[0,2r−1] by Sd(r, n) = (s(r, n)
mod d, s(r, n + 1) mod d). The following link between ψ and S can be proved
by induction.
Lemma 1. Let r ! 0, ( > 0 and let m ∈ M! such that ψ(m) = (a, b). Then
S(r + 1, .) is a one to one map from [0, 2r+1 − 1] onto Ar(m).
It means that in our case, the values ψ(c) and ∆(ψ(c)) for c ∈M0! correspond
to the elements S(( + 1, n) for n ∈ [0, 2!+1 − 1] and (a, b) = (F!+2, F!+3). Re-
cently, Reznick proved in [35] that, for d ! 2, (a, b) = (1, 1), and r sufficiently
large, the sequence {Sd(r, n)}n∈N is well distributed among Sd := {(i mod d, j
mod d) | gcd(i, j, d) = 1}. We need a similar result for any couple (a, b) in order
to show that the values χ(c) are asymptotically well distributed modulo d. We
will use similar notations and follow the arguments of [35] to prove the next
theorem. We define :
– for γ ∈ Sd, Bd(r, γ) := #{n ∈ [0, 2r − 1] |Sd(r, n) = γ},
– χd, the map such that χd(m) = χ(m) mod d,
– ψd the map such that if ψ(m) = (v, u) then ψd(m) = (v mod d, u mod d),
– Nd the cardinality of Sd.
Theorem 3. Let (a, b, d) ∈ N3 such that d be prime and (a, d) = (b, d) = 1.
There exist constants cd and ρd < 2 so that if m ∈ N and α ∈ Sd, then for all
r ! 0,
|Bd(r,α) − 2
r
Nd
| < cdρrd.
Proof. Due to the lack of space, we just give a short proof of this, following the
arguments of section 4 in [35] and pointing out the differences. Since d is prime,
we have Sd = Z/dZ × Z/dZ \ {(0, 0)}, and Nd = d2 − 1. We can define a graph
Gd and the applications L and R in the same way, and also have Ld = Rd = id.
In the proof of lemma 14, we have to give a slightly different proof that for each
α = (x, y) ∈ Sd there exists a way from (a, b) toα in the graphGd. Notice that since
(0, 0) +∈ Sd, then either x += 0 or y += 0. If y += 0, we notice that Rk′(Lk(a, b)) =
(a + k′(b + ka), b + ka). As (a, d) = 1, we can choose k such that b + ka = y.
Thus, as y += 0, we can choose k′ such that a + k′(b + ka) = x and we are done.
If x += 0, then we consider Lk′(Rk(a, b)) = (a + kb, b + k′(a + kb)) : in the same
way, we can choose (k, k′) such that a+ kb = x and b+ k′(a+ kb) = y. In the first
line of the proof of lemma 14, we also have to consider (r0, n0) ∈ N×N such that
Sd(r0, n0) = (0, 1) rather than Sd(0, 0) = (0, 1). Thus the adjacency matrix of
the graph satisfies the same properties as in theorem 15 of [35]. So the conclusion
remains true for Bd.
From Theorem 3 and Lemma 1 we can now give the proof of Theorem 1.
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Proof. Let α ∈ (Z/dZ)∗, and (βi, γi)1!i!d the d elements of Z/dZ × Z/dZ \
{(0, 0)} such that βi + γi = α, then
#{x ∈Mr | χd(mx) = α} =∑di=1#{x ∈Mr | ψd(mx) = (βi, γi)}.
If n ∈ [0, 2r+1] is such that Sd(r + 1, n) = (βi, γi) then , thanks to Lemma 1,
it corresponds to x ∈Mr such that ψd(mx) = (βi, γi) or ψd(mx) = (γi,βi). In
this last case, there exists an integer j, such that (γi,βi) = (βj , γj). Hence,
d∑
i=1
#{n ∈ [0, 2r+1−1] | Sd(r+1, n) = (βi, γi)} = 2×#{x ∈Mr | χd(mx) = α}.
Now by definition of Bd :
d∑
i=1
#{n ∈ [0, 2r+1 − 1] | Sd(r + 1, n) = (βi, γi)} =
d∑
i=1
Bd(r + 1, (βi, γi)).
Thus,
#{x ∈Mr | χd(mx) = α}
2r
− d
d2 − 1 =
d∑
i=1
(
Bd(r + 1, (βi, γi))
2r+1
− 1
d2 − 1
)
.
Then we can use Theorem 3 and the triangular inequality to prove the first
inequality of the theorem. Using this inequality for α += 0 we prove the second
inequality.
Proof of Theorem 2
From now on, we will denote bym, the value χ(m). Let us setM = sup {m |m ∈
M!,p} and I = inf {m | m ∈ M!,p}. If m ∈ M!,p is not one of the words of
the points ii) (resp. iii)), we will propose m′ ∈ M!,p such that m′ < m (resp.
m′ > m). The lemmas in the two following subsections give the details about
the words m′ we use to compare.
We first look for m ∈M!,p such that m = I. First suppose that two 1’s in the
word m are separated by one 0 or more. Then we can consider (m,n, s) ∈ (N∗)3
and (a, b) ∈ N2 and (x, y) ∈Ma ×Mb such that m is one of the words
1m0n1s, x10m1n0y or y01n0m1x.
We won’t consider the third case because it is the symmetric of the second one.
The lemma 2 shows that 1m0n1s > 1m+s0n and that x10m1n0y > x1n+10m+1y.
So if m = I, there are no 0 between two 1 of the word m, and so there are
integers a and c such that m = 0a1p0c. From lemma 3 we show that a = 0 (and
so c = (− p) or c = 0 (and so a = (− p).
Now we look for m ∈ M!,p such that m = M . If there are two consecutive
1’s in the word m, as 2p < ( the word m will also have two consecutive 0’s.
We can consider the symmetry such that a subword 00 appears in m before a
subword 11. In this case there exists (a, b, n) ∈ N3 and (x, y) ∈Ma ×Mb such
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that m = x00(10)n11y. In this case, we have from lemma 4 that m < x(01)n+2y.
Now assume that there are no subword 11 in m. If two 1’s in the word m are
separated by two 0’s or more, then there exists (m,n, a, b) ∈ (N∗)2×N2, x ∈Ma
and y ∈Mb such that m is one of the words
x010n(01)m, x010n(01)m0, x010n(01)m02y,
10n(01)m, 10n(01)m0, or 10n(01)m02y.
The Lemmas (5) and (6) give us in any case m′ ∈ M!,p such that m < m′.
We have just proved that 11 is not a subword of m, and that two 1’s of m are
separated by exactly one 0. So the word m or its symmetric is 0a(01)p0c where
(a, c) ∈ N×N. The lemma (7) shows thatM is reached when a = 0 (so c = (−2p)
or when c = 1 (so a = (− 2p− 1). Then the point iii) is proved.
Now we just have to apply Proposition 1 to deduce i) from ii) and iii).
Lemmas to Find the Lower Bound
Lemma 2. Let (m,n, s) ∈ (N∗)3 and (a, b) ∈ N2. Let x ∈Ma and y ∈Mb. We
have
i) 1m0n1s > 1m+s0n and
ii) x10m1n0y > x1n+10m+1y.
Proof. For the point i) , we compute
1m0n1s = (1, 2)
(
1 m
0 1
)(
Fn−1 Fn
Fn Fn+1
)(
1 s
0 1
)(
1
1
)
, so
1m0n1s = (s+ 1)Fn−1 +
(
(s+ 1)(m+ 2) + 1
)
Fn + (m+ 2)Fn+1. (2)
Also, 1m+s0n = (1, 2)
(
1 m+ s
0 1
)(
Fn−1 Fn
Fn Fn+1
)(
1
1
)
, so
1m+s0n = (2 +m+ s+ 1)Fn+1 + (2 +m+ s)Fn. (3)
The difference between (2) and (3) is msFn, so it is positive in the conditions
of the lemma. We can notice that there is equality when s = 0 or when m = 0,
which can also be explained by the symmetry.
To prove the point ii), let us set (v, u) = ψ(x). We have
ψ(x10m1n0) = (v, u)
(
1 1
0 1
)(
Fm−1 Fm
Fm Fm+1
)(
1 n
0 1
)(
0 1
1 1
)
=
(
(nFm+Fm+1)u+(nFm+1+Fm+2)v, Fm+2u+(Fm+1+(n+1)Fm+2)v+(u−v)nFm
)
.
(4)
We also compute
ψ(x1n+10m+1) = (v, u)
(
1 n+ 1
0 1
)(
Fm Fm+1
Fm+1 Fm+2
)
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= (Fm+1u+ (Fm + (n+ 1)Fm+1)v, Fm+2u+ (Fm+1 + (n+ 1)Fm+2)v). (5)
As u > v, we can deduce the point ii) from the comparison components by
components of the vectors (4) and (5).
Lemma 3. Let (a, b, c) ∈ (N∗)3, we have 0a1b0c > 1b0a+c.
Proof. We first compute the left hand side
0a1b0c = (1, 2)
(
Fa−1 Fa
Fa Fa+1
)(
1 b
0 1
)(
Fc−1 Fc
Fc Fc+1
)(
1
1
)
= (Fa+2Fc−1 + (bFa+2 + Fa+3)Fc + Fa+2Fc + (bFa+2 + Fa+3)Fc+1+)
= Fa+2Fc+1 + Fa+3Fc+2 + bFa+2Fc+2. (6)
We also compute the right hand side
1b0a+c = (1, 2)
(
1 b
0 1
)(
Fa+c−1 Fa+c
Fa+c Fa+c+1
)(
1
1
)
= (Fa+c−1 + (b+ 2)Fa+c + Fa+c + (b + 2)Fa+c+1)
= Fa+c+4 + bFa+c+2.
With eq. 1, page 242 we show that it is
Fa+2Fc+1 + Fa+3Fc+2 + bFa+c+2. (7)
The difference between (6) and (7) is b(Fa+c+2 − Fa+2Fc+2) = bFcFa, which is
positive in the conditions of the lemma. In the cases c = 0 or a = 0, there is
equality which we already knew by the symmetry.
Lemmas to Compute the Upper Bound
Lemma 4. Let (n, a, b) ∈ N3. For all x ∈Ma and y ∈Mb we have
x00(10)n11y < x(01)n+2y.
Proof. We first compute
S20 (S1S0)
n S21 =
(
1 1
1 2
)(
αn 2βn
βn αn
)(
1 2
0 1
)
=
(
αn + βn 3αn + 4βn
αn + 2βn 4αn + 6βn
)
.
We set (v, u) = ψ(x), so we have
ψ(x00(10)n11) = (v, u)
(
αn + βn 3αn + 4βn
αn + 2βn 4αn + 6βn
)
= (v(αn + βn) + u(αn + 2βn), v(3αn + 4βn) + u(4αn + 6βn)) .
(8)
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From the other hand
S0S1 (S0S1)
n S0S1 =
(
0 1
1 2
)(
αn − βn βn
βn αn + βn
)(
0 1
1 2
)
=
(
αn + βn 2αn + 3βn
2αn + 3βn 5αn + 7βn
)
, so
ψ(x(01)n+2) = (v(αn + βn) + u(2αn + 3βn), v(2αn + 3βn) + u(5αn + 7βn)) . (9)
As v < u we can compare the vectors (8) and (9) components by components
and then conclude.
Lemma 5. Let (m,n, a, b) ∈ (N∗)2×N2 . For all x ∈Ma and y ∈Mb, we have
i) x010n(01)m < x(01)m+10n
ii) x010n(01)m0 < x(01)m+10n+1
iii) x010n(01)m02y < x(01)m+10n+2y.
Proof. We compute
S0S1S
n
0 =
(
0 1
1 2
)(
Fn−1 Fn
Fn Fn+1
)
=
(
Fn Fn+1
Fn+2 Fn+3
)
.
We deduce
S0S1S
n
0 (S0S1)
m =
(
Fn Fn+1
Fn+2 Fn+3
)(
αm − βm βm
βm αm + βm
)
and so
S0S1S
n
0 (S0S1)
m =
(
αmFn + βmFn−1 αmFn+1 + βmFn+2
αmFn+2 + βmFn+1 αmFn+3 + βmFn+4
)
. (10)
From the other hand, we can write (S0S1)
m+1 Sn0 = (S0S1)
m S0S1Sn0 so
(S0S1)
m+1 Sn0 =
(
αm − βm βm
βm αm + βm
)(
Fn Fn+1
Fn+2 Fn+3
)
, and then
(S0S1)
m+1 Sn0 =
(
αmFn + βmFn+1 αmFn+1 + βmFn+2
αmFn+2 + βm(Fn + Fn+2) αmFn+3 + βm(Fn+1 + Fn+3)
)
(11)
Let us set (v, u) = ψ(x).
ψ(x010n(01)m) = (v, u)
(
αmFn + βmFn−1 αmFn+1 + βmFn+2
αmFn+2 + βmFn+1 αmFn+3 + βmFn+4
)(
1
1
)
= v(αmFn+2 + βmFn−1 + βmFn+2) + u(αmFn+4 + βmFn+1 + βmFn+4). (12)
We also have
ψ(x(01)m+10n) = (v, u)
(
αmFn + βmFn+1 αmFn+1 + βmFn+2
αmFn+2 + βm(Fn + Fn+2) αmFn+3 + βm(Fn+1 + Fn+3)
)(
1
1
)
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= v(αmFn+2 + βmFn+1 + βmFn+2) + u(αmFn+4 + βmFn+2 + βmFn+4). (13)
The difference between (13) and (12) is vβmFn + uβmFn so we deduce the first
point.
To prove the point ii) we use (10) which gives
S0S1S
n
0 (S0S1)
m S0 =
(
αmFn+1 + βmFn+2 αmFn+2 + βmFn−1 + βmFn+2
αmFn+3 + βmFn+4 αmFn+4 + βmFn+1 + βmFn+4
)
(14)
Let us set (v, u) = ψ(x). We have
x010n(01)m0 = v(αmFn+3 + βmFn−1 + 2βmFn+2)
+u(αmFn+5 + βmFn+1 + 2βmFn+4).
(15)
From (11) we deduce
(S0S1)
m+1 Sn+10 =
(
αmFn+1 + βmFn+2 αmFn+2 + βmFn+3
αmFn+3 + βmFn+1 + βmFn+3 αmFn+4 + βmFn+2 + βmFn+4
)
(16)
So
x(01)m+10n+1 = v(αmFn+3 + βmFn+4) + u(αmFn+5 + βmFn+3 + βmFn+5). (17)
The difference between (17) and (15) is vβmFn so we have the positivity. To
prove iii) we compute from (14) and (16)
S0S1S
n
0 (S0S1)
m S20 =
(
αmFn+2 + βmFn−1 + βmFn+2 αmFn+3 + βmFn−1 + 2βmFn+2
αmFn+4 + βmFn+1 + βmFn+4 αmFn+5 + βmFn+1 + 2βmFn+4
)
and (S0S1)
m+1 Sn+20 =
(
αmFn+2 + βmFn+3 αmFn+3 + βmFn+4
αmFn+4 + βmFn+2 + βmFn+4 αmFn+5 + βmFn+3 + βmFn+5
)
.
We compare components by components and then deduce iii)
Lemma 6. Let (m,n, b) ∈ (N∗)2 × N and y ∈Mb. We have
i) 10n(01)m < (01)m+10n−1,
ii) 10n(01)m0 < (01)m+10n,
iii) 10n(01)m02y < (01)m+10n+1y.
Proof. We will use the computations of the proof of lemma 5. Let us consider
that ψ(x) = (1, 1). In this case ψ(x0) would be (1, 2), and we would have
x010n(01)m = 10n(01)m. So with (12) we have
10n(01)m = αmFn+2+βmFn−1+βmFn+2+αmFn+4+βmFn+1+βmFn+4. (18)
Random Euclidean Addition Chain Generation and Its Application 261
With (11) we have
(01)m+10n−1 = αmFn+1 + βmFn + βmFn+1+2αmFn+3+2βmFn+1 +2βmFn+3,
(19)
so (01)m+10n−1 − 10n(01)m = αmFn−1 + βmFn+2, and then we have the point
i) . In the same way, we also have
10n(01)m0 = αmFn+3+βmFn−1+2βmFn+2+αmFn+5+βmFn+1+2βmFn+4, and
(01)m+10n = αmFn+2+βmFn+1+βmFn+2+2αmFn+4+βmFn+2+βmFn+4, so
(01)m+10n − 10n(01)m0 = Fn(αm + 2βm) and then we deduce the point ii) .
Now, ψ(10n(01)m02) = (1, 1)S0S1Sn0 (S0S1)mS20 , and with (15) we find
ψ(10n(01)m02) = (αm(Fn+2 + Fn+4) +βm(Fn−1 + Fn+5),
αm(Fn+3 + Fn+5) + βm(Fn−1 + Fn+5)).
(20)
With (11) we compute
ψ((01)m+10n+1) = (αm(Fn+1+ 2Fn+3) + βm(Fn+1 + 3Fn+3),
αm(Fn+2 + 2Fn+4) + βm(Fn+2 + 3Fn+4).
(21)
The difference of the first component of (21) by the first component of (20) is
αmFn−2 + βmFn+2, and the difference of the second components is αmFn +
βm(2Fn+4 − Fn−1 − Fn+1) so the point iii) is proved.
Lemma 7. Let (a, b, c) ∈ N × N∗ × N. If c += 1 and a += 0 then 0a(01)b0c <
(01)b0a+c.
Proof. We compute
0a(01)b0c = (1, 2)
(
Fa−1 Fa
Fa Fa+1
)(
αb − βb βb
βb αb + βb
)(
Fc−1 Fc
Fc Fc+1
)(
1
1
)
= αb(Fa+2Fc+1 + Fa+3Fc+2) + βb(Fa+1Fc+1 + Fa+4Fc+2). (22)
On the other hand
(01)b0a+c = (1, 2)
(
αb − βb βb
βb αb + βb
)(
Fa+c−1 Fa+c
Fa+c Fa+c+1
)(
1
1
)
= αbFa+c+4 + βb(Fa+c+2 + Fa+c+4). (23)
Using eq. 1, we prove that the difference between (23) by (22) is βbFa(Fc+1−Fc).
It is zero if and only if a = 0 or c = 1, and positive otherwise.
